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9.1  Introduction 
Although Taiwan switched to a flexible exchange rate system in  1979, the 
New  Taiwan  (NT) dol1arAJ.S.  dollar exchange rate remained virtually fixed 
under the Central Bank’s firm control until 1985. During this time the macroe- 
conomics situation in Taiwan changed drastically. For instance, Taiwan’s trade 
surplus increased rapidly in the early  1980s, with the trade surplus to GNP 
ratio increasing from 0.05 percent in 1980 to 17.87 percent in 1985. However, 
the government made no concrete or immediate efforts to reduce the ever- 
growing macroeconomic disequilibrium. The major macro policy during this 
period was large-scale intervention in the monetary market in order to sterilize 
the effect of the trade surplus on money supply. Nevertheless, the sterilization 
policy not only restricted the automatic mechanism for reducing the trade sur- 
plus through more domestic expenditure and a higher inflation rate, but also 
aggravated the trade imbalance via less domestic credit creation (Chen 1985). 
Due partly to the inactive policies in the early 1980s but most importantly to 
U.S. pressure on Taiwan to reduce its bilateral trade surplus with the United 
States, the burden of adjustment became formidable for Taiwan after 1985. 
This paper analyzes the impact on Taiwan’s export structure of the sharply 
appreciated local currency over the past five to six years, with special reference 
to Japan and the United States, Taiwan’s two major trading partners. Before 
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analyzing the changes in commodity structure after 1985, in the next section 
we will offer some background information about Taiwan’s trade surplus and 
exchange rate appreciation in the 1980s. Then in sections 9.3 and 9.4 we will 
examine the changes in factor intensities and other characteristics of Taiwan’s 
exports. Finally, we  will compare the composition of  exports from Taiwan, 
Japan, and the United States with various measures of commodity characteris- 
tics. Some inferences can then be drawn about how and at what speed Taiwan’s 
production and export structure will adjust as it approaches the per capita GNP 
level of  a developed country. 
9.2  Trade Surplus and Exchange Rate Appreciation 
Taiwan’s economy was hit by  a huge trade surplus in the 1980s-the  trade 
surplus to GDP ratio reached nearly 20 percent in 1986. Since 1985, interna- 
tional pressure on Taiwan to reduce its trade surplus has become so intense 
that Taiwan has had to rapidly appreciate its currency against the U.S. dollar. 
The exchange rate appreciated from about 40 NT dollars per U.S. dollar to 26 
NT dollars per U.S. dollar between  1985 and  1989. As a result, the rate of 
appreciation of the NT dollar in the second half of the 1980s was higher than 
that of most currencies in the world. Table 9.1 shows the price indices of some 
major currencies in terms of NT dollars. As all indices are set equal to 100 for 
March 1992, if the NT dollar has appreciated against a certain currency since 
a specific period, the index of that currency for that period is greater than 100. 
Conversely an index less than  100 in a period implies that the NT dollar has 
Table 9.1  Price Indices of Major Currencies in Terms of the NT Dollar 
British 
U.S.  Pound  Deutsche  French  Japanese  Korean 
Year  Dollar  Sterling  Mark  Franc  Yen  Won 
1980  140.85  192.65  119.10  173.74  92.26  165.42 
1981  148.02  163.17  108.43  144.20  89.5 1  163.76 
1982  156.13  146.06  108.11  129.54  88.34  161.59 
1983  157.54  132.00  95.38  105.47  90.21  153.48 
1984  154.41  103.61  81.16  89.72  81.77  144.63 
1985  155.90  129.54  104.49  115.32  103.39  135.72 
1986  138.86  11  7.60  117.42  120.13  116.05  124.93 
1987  111.63  120.18  115.80  115.97  119.27  109.20 
1988  110.14  115.04  102.62  101.53  116.46  124.78 
1989  102.5 1  94.68  99.45  98.47  93.80  116.90 
1990  106.19  117.69  116.90  115.97  103.80  114.87 
1991  100.86  108.15  108.82  107.88  106.09  102.74 
1992  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Sources: International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.: IMF, various issues); Financial Sta- 
tistics Monthly: The Republic of  China (Taipei: Ministry of Finance, various issues). 
Notes: Data refer to the end of each period. Prices in March 1992 are set equal to 100. 229  Export Structure and Exchange Rate Variation in Taiwan 
depreciated against that currency since that period. As shown in  table 9.1, 
since 1980 the NT dollar has appreciated against all currencies except the Japa- 
nese yen. 
In addition to the rapid appreciation of the NT dollar, wage rates in Taiwan 
also rose rapidly in the 1980s due both to the promulgation of  the Labor Law 
in 1983, which tended to raise concern for labor welfare, and to the booming 
economy, particularly the service sector, in the second half of the 1980s. Con- 
sequently, unit labor costs in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector as measured in 
U.S. dollars increased much faster than such costs for all of Taiwan’s major 
competitors, with Japan the only probable exception (see table 9.2). One clear 
implication is that the international competitiveness of  Taiwan’s  traditional, 
usually labor-intensive, export products had to have worsened sharply in that 
period. In order to maintain the same market position as before, Taiwan has 
had to promptly switch exports from traditional labor-intensive products to 
those with which Taiwan can rebuild an international comparative, or competi- 
tive, advantage.’ 
The pressure for structural change in Taiwan’s exports after 1985 was further 
reinforced by two structural factors, namely the decline of domestic investment 
after 1980 and the falling share of the manufacturing sector in GDP. Although 
the appreciation of the NT dollar was caused mainly by  Taiwan’s huge trade 
surplus, the surplus before 1985 was not solely the result of the strong interna- 
tional competitiveness of Taiwan’s products. Instead, insufficient domestic in- 
vestment also had a role to play (Chen 1989; Schive 1991). 
Since Taiwan is a comparatively open economy, with trade playing an ever- 
increasing role, the growth rate of GNP and that of exports are usually highly 
correlated. Even in economically bad years, both indicators have  shown the 
same direction. For example, Taiwan’s exports and GNP both grew minimally 
in  1981 and  1985, as shown in table 9.3. Moreover, a sharp decline in the 
growth of Taiwan’s domestic investment in early 1980s can be detected from 
table 9.3. The growth rate of  gross fixed capital formation in real terms was 
almost zero between 1981 and 1986, while the growth rate before 1981 aver- 
aged about 10 percent. Even without detailed discussion of the sources of Tai- 
wan’s trade surplus, data from table 9.3 are probably sufficient to show that the 
international competitiveness of Taiwan’s products was not at its peak in 1985. 
After 1986, the policy aimed at reducing the trade surplus via exchange rate 
appreciation put intense pressure on Taiwan’s trade sector to adjust. 
In addition to the rapid appreciation of the NT dollar, the overexpanded na- 
ture of the manufacturing sector compared to that in most developed countries 
also accentuated the need for structural change in Taiwan after 1985. Kuznets 
pointed out more than three decades ago that the share of different sectors in 
1. Three other papers tackle the same issue from different aspects, including upgrading export 
products, introducing more automated machiney and equipment, and making outward investment. 
See Schive (1991, 1992a. 1992b). Table 9.2  Unit Labor Cost in U.S. Dollars: 1980-91 (1982=100) 
United  United  West 
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97  103  94  98  86  93  95 
108  99  90  96  77  87  86 
112  97  88  97  77  88  85 
127  142  83  97  91  117  120 
160  157  91  94  103  138  156 
170  173  112  92  112  138  160 
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199  -  160  - 
200  -  163  - 
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83  126 
89  108 
100  100 
99  93 
91  87 
88  90 
91  128 
99  167 
111  170 
123  160 
130  117  155  I10 
I26  105  120  103 
100  100  100  100 
86  93  84  99 
79  85  81  89 
81  86  85  88 
110  110  109  116 
129  132  130  138 
126  141  141  140 
146  143  122  130 
Sources:  Monthly  Labor Review  (Washington, D.C.:  Department of  Labor, Bureau of  Labor Statistics, August  1991); Monthly Bulletin of  Earnings and 
Productivify Statistics (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS], Executive Yuan, April 1992). 231  Export Structure and Exchange Rate Variation in Taiwan 
Table 9.3  Growth Rate of Taiwanese GNP, Trade, and Capital Formation (%) 
Exports of  Goods  Imports of  Goods  Gross Fixed 
Year  GNP  and Services  and Services  Capital Formation 
1980  24.31 
1981  18.51 
1982  6.85 
1983  9.96 
1984  1 I .43 
1985  5.29 
1986  16.33 
1987  12.41 
1988  9.01 
1989  10.70 
1990  9.02 





































Source:  Quarterly National  Economic  Trends  Taiwan Area:  The  Republic  of  China  (Taipei: 
DGBAS, Executive Yuan, February 1992). 
an economy changes over time as the economy moves through different stages 
of development, a phenomenon also known as the Clark hypothesis. The expe- 
riences of many developed countries indicates that the share of manufacturing 
sector in GDP increases in the early development stage, then decreases in later 
stages. The turning point seems to be around the per capita GDP level of 
$5,000 (U.S.; 1985 prices), and the highest level of manufacturing in the major 
Western countries is about 40 percent of GDP (Chen and Lee 1988). 
When Taiwan’s per capita GNP was around $5,000 (U.S.) in 1987, the manu- 
facturing sector share of GDP was also around 40 percent. The share of Tai- 
wan’s manufacturing sector in GDP has followed the same general pattern over 
time as other developed economies have experienced. In 1986 Taiwan reached 
a record share for manufacturing in GDP of 39.70 percent, but this share fell 
to only 34 percent in 199  1. Since the declining ratio means that the manufac- 
turing sector grew much more slowly than the whole economy, certain indus- 
tries in  the manufacturing sector must have  encountered mounting pressure 
and difficulties requiring change. How the manufacturing sector has responded 
to these challenges should be a major concern. 
9.3  Changes in the Factor Intensities of Taiwan’s Exports 
With the significant rise in Taiwan’s labor costs, standard trade theory asserts 
that Taiwan’s international comparative advantage and trade structure should 
change. However, there are some difficulties involved in measuring structural 
changes in trade. First, the production factors actually used are more than just 
capital and labor. A relative decline of labor-intensive products in total trade, 
thus, may  not imply a relative increase in capital-intensive products in total 232  Pochih Chen, Chi Schive, and Cheng Chung Chu 
trade. Moreover, trade data are generally classified by commodity or by indus- 
try. It is by  no  means an easy job to examine changes in  trade structure in 
relation to changes in comparative advantages. 
Fortunately, a recent study sponsored by  the Ministry of  Finance (Chen, 
Schive, and Wu  1991) on the reclassification of tradable commodities provides 
relevant data and classification criteria to analyze the commodity structure of 
trade in Taiwan and other countries as well. An input-output table for 1986 
and other statistics for Taiwan were used to identify the characteristics of each 
industry. The characteristics of each commodity in the H.S. classification are 
then assumed to remain unchanged across different countries for country com- 
parative studies.z 
Table 9.4 classifies Taiwan’s exports according to the factorhnput intensities 
of commodities. The degree of labor intensity of each product was measured 
by the ratio of  domestic labor expenditures embodled in the product to the 
total domestic factor income that the product contains. Then all industries were 
divided into three groups-high,  medium, and low-according  to the level of 
this measure. The results from table 9.4 show that the share of highly labor- 
intensive commodities in total trade declined from 47.03 percent in 1986 to 
40.10 percent in 1991.  In contrast, the share in total trade of commodities with 
low labor intensities increased from 14.89 percent in  1987 to 21.17 percent in 
1991. The direction of  the structural change in trade seems to be in line with 
that expected, but the speed of adjustment may be considered only moderate. 
The indicator for capital intensity was measured by the ratio of total domes- 
tic capital to labor used directly and indirectly in the production. Note then 
that the ranking of industries by this measure may not equal the reverse of the 
ranking according to labor intensity just discussed. The ratio of products with 
high capital intensities in Taiwan’s total exports increased from 22.35 percent 
in 1987 to 29.81 percent in 1991, and that with low capital intensities dropped 
from 27.72 percent in  1986 to  19.21 percent in  1991. The directions and 
speeds of adjustment were similar to those for labor intensities. 
When commodities were reclassified by the degree of human capital inten- 
sity, the speed of adjustment in trade structure seems to be faster than in the 
previous two cases. Human capital intensity is measured by the ratio of work- 
ers with a college degree or higher educational attainment relative to the total 
direct and indirect employment of an industry. Table 9.4 shows that the propor- 
tion of products with a high degree of human capital intensity in Taiwan’s ex- 
ports increased from 18.37 percent in 1986 to 27.23 percent in  1991, while 
the proportion of  low human-capital-intensity products declined from 47.94 
percent in 1986 to 34.26 percent in 1991. The direction of adjustment is consis- 
2. The “H.S. classification” refers to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Sys- 
tem of the Customs Cooperation Council. We  are fully aware that factor intensity may change 
in different countries. Nevertheless, the reclassification of tradable commodities following each 
country’s own standard would complicate the country comparison  to an almost unmanageable 
degree. Further discussion on this point is addressed in section 9.5 of this paper. Table 9.4  Export Structure of Taiwan by Input Intensities, 1985-91 (a) 
Degree of  Degree of  Degree of  Degree of Human 
Labor Intensity  Capital Intensity  Capital Intensity  Energy Intensity 
Year  High  Mid  Low  High  Mid  Low  High  Mid  Low  High  Mid  Low 
1985  45.93  35.60  18.47  24.48  48.70  26.83  18.75  33.62  47.63  14.14  46.89  38.97 
1986  47.03  36.93  16.05  22.91  49.37  27.72  18.37  33.68  47.94  11.82  46.55  41.62 
1987  47.93  37.18  14.89  22.35  50.52  27.13  19.30  35.30  45.40  10.84  45.39  43.77 
1988  46.27  36.79  16.94  23.49  51.50  25.01  22.55  36.92  40.53  12.37  48.05  44.56 
1989  43.44  37.75  18.80  26.59  50.73  22.66  24.25  38.10  37.65  13.07  45.29  41.64 
1990  41.02  38.30  20.68  28.95  50.54  20.51  26.73  38.57  34.70  13.78  45.37  40.85 
1991  40.10  38.73  21.17  29.81  50.96  19.21  27.23  38.51  34.26  13.89  45.74  40.37 
Source: Calculated from tapes of trade statistics of Taiwan (Taipei: Ministry of  Finance). 
Nore: For definitions of  measures, see text (also, Chen, Schive, and Wu  1991). 234  Pochih Chen, Chi Schive, and Cheng Chung.Chu 
tent again with what one may expect, but the faster adjustment in this classifi- 
cation is of  particular interest. More discussions on this point will be  pre- 
sented later. 
Commodities were further classified by  energy intensity, with the result that 
the ratios of  products with different energy intensities changed only slightly 
despite significant changes in energy prices during the period of observation. 
Part of  this result is due to the fact that many energy goods are tradable, so 
that the relative opportunity cost of energy faced by Taiwan and other countries 
is stable despite wide fluctuations in oil price. Consequently, the main factor 
determining the international comparative advantage of energy-intensive prod- 
ucts would be differences in the efficiency of energy use in different countries 
rather than the relative factor cost of  the countries involved (Caves, Frankel, 
and Jones 1990, 185-87).  It also implies that a relative increase of wage rates 
or labor costs may not change the comparative advantage of energy-intensive 
products significantly. 
9.4  Other Forms of Structural Change in Taiwan’s Exports 
Chen, Schive, and Wu (1991) have  also applied other criteria to classify 
trade commodities. Table 9.5 regroups Taiwan’s exports into ten categories ac- 
cording to the stages of  fabrication or the use of  commodities applied in a 
World Bank study (Balassa 1981). The results shown in table 9.5 indicate fur- 
ther the rapid structural adjustment of Taiwan’s exports in the late 1980s. 
The shares of  primary products and processed food declined steadily as 
would be expected. Among the categories with increasing shares in Taiwan’s 
exports, type B intermediate products, which are those intermediate products 
readily usable as final products, replaced consumer nondurable goods as the 
largest category in Taiwan’s exports. The share of type B intermediate products 
was only 25.98 percent in 1986, but increased sharply to 36.97 percent in 1991. 
The decline of consumer nondurable goods is even more striking. The share of 
this category dropped from 35.34 percent in 1986 to 22 percent in 1991. The 
primary reason behind this drastic change is the change in the relative labor 
costs between Taiwan and its competing countries explained earlier (table 9.2). 
However, it is also worth noting that rapid outward investment since 1986 from 
Taiwan to neighboring countries with low labor costs was another factor be- 
hind this drastic change (Schive 1991). Many Taiwanese multinational firms 
are now  importing intermediate products and capital goods from Taiwan to 
produce final products in neighboring countries. The shares of both intermedi- 
ate products and capital goods in Taiwan’s exports increased while that of con- 
sumer goods, both durables and nondurables, declined. Moreover, the share of 
the U.S. market held by Taiwan’s exports decreased from nearly 48 percent in 
1986 to 28 percent in  1991, while the share of  Taiwanese exports going to 
neighboring developing countries as well as the share of  U.S. imports from 
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10.30  1.11 
10.84  1.86 
13.14  1.86 
15.36  1.54 
15.41  1.89 
16.31  2.11 
16.10  2.12 
Source: See table 9.4. 
Nore: Intermediate products A is defined as products used in the manufacturing process of other intermediate products. Intermediate products B refers to 
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Because outward investment may slow down in the future but not reverse, the 
resulting impact on the domestic economy is likely to be permanent. In addi- 
tion, since Taiwan’s total exports in U.S. dollars almost doubled from 1986 to 
1991, all categories of  exports grew during that period. Thus, the structural 
change in Taiwan’s export coincided with a rather high export growth rate and 
was not attributable to the shrinking of  certain categories. A clear implication 
is that the significant changes in trade structure in the second half of the 1980s 
were less attributable to Taiwan’s short-term business cycle than to long-term 
structural changes. 
The increasing share of producer goods in Taiwan’s exports may be regarded 
as an indication  of  the upgrading of  Taiwan’s  economy. The rapidly rising 
shares  of  less  labor-intensive, highly  capital-intensive, or  highly  human- 
capital-intensive goods also has similar implications. A more traditional and 
easier way to identify whether there has been industrial upgrading is to look at 
the share of heavy and chemical industries or the share of high-tech products 
in total exports. According to table 9.6, the share of heavy and chemical indus- 
tries in Taiwan’s exports increased from 35.63 percent in 1986 to 46.71 percent 
in 1991. The share of high-tech products jumped from 27.56 percent in 1986 to 
36.23 percent in 1991. Both measures indicate a roughly 10 percentage point 
increase over the short period of five years. Therefore, Taiwan’s export structure 
did change significantly regardless of  which indicator is used to measure the 
change. 
9.5  A Comparison between Taiwan, Japan, and the United States 
As expected, Taiwan’s  export structure has been changing rapidly to re- 
semble that of a developed country. Yet it is not clear whether the export struc- 
tures of developed countries are indeed consistent with what has been gener- 
Table 9.6  Share of Heavy and Chemical and High-Tech Products in Taiwanese 
Exports, 1985-91  (%) 
Non-Heavy 
Heavy Chemical  Chemical 
Industries  Industries  High-Tech  Non-High-Tech 
Year  Products  Products  Products  Products 
1985  36.47  63.53  27.03  72.97 
1986  35.63  64.31  21.56  72.44 
1987  37.89  62.11  30.03  69.97 
1988  42.84  57.16  33.70  66.30 
1989  44.53  55.47  33.92  66.08 
1990  46.67  53.33  35.87  64.13 
1991  46.71  53.29  36.23  63.17 
Source: See table 9.4. 237  Export Structure and Exchange Rate Variation in Taiwan 
ally assumed. Moreover, in order to better understand how fast the Taiwanese 
economic structure has been changing, some information about the current 
state of the trade structure of  developed countries is useful as a reference point 
for Taiwan. The same classifications used before were applied to calculate the 
export structures of Japan and the United States. Two minor points should be 
mentioned. First, because both countries changed their system of commodity 
classification recently, only data for recent years was analyzed. Second, be- 
cause the criteria for commodity classification were taken directly from those 
developed for Taiwan, the results may  not correctly reflect the actual export 
structures of Japan and the United States. Nevertheless, the results turn out to 
be consistent with both the theory and what has been found before. 
Table 9.7 shows the export structures of Japan and the United States by input 
intensities. The export structure of Japan in table 9.7 was stable over the last 
four years. Relative to Japan, exports of the United States were more inclined 
to high labor-intensity, low capital-intensity, and low human-capital-intensity 
products, yet the gaps between the United States and Japan were much smaller 
than those between Taiwan and Japan or between Taiwan and the United States. 
Moreover, the gaps between the United States and Japan and those between 
Taiwan and the two developed countries have been shrinking in the last few 
years. 
The share of high labor-intensity products in Taiwan’s exports in 1991 was 
40.10 percent, which was 1.4 percentage points higher than the U.S. level, but 
the U.S. share was 7.3 percentage points higher than the Japanese level. From 
this point of view, the export structure of the United States seems to be closer 
to Taiwan’s than to Japan’s. However, the share of low labor-intensity products 
in Taiwan was only 2 1.17 percent in 199  1, while the same figure in the United 
Table 9.7  Export Structure of the United States and Japan by Input Intensities, 
1988-91  (%) 
Degree of  Labor  Degree of Capital  Degree of  Human  Degree of Energy 
Intensity  Intensity  Capital Intensity  Intensity 
Year  High  Middle  Low  High  Middle  Low  High  Middle  Low  High  Middle  Low 
United States 
1989  41.01  25.26  33.74  38.31  39.26  22.43  63.09  16.88  20.03  15.13  41.72  43.15 
1990  39.51  26.08  34.41  38.80  41.35  19.86  62.66  17.43  19.90  14.43  44.44  41.13 
1991  38.68  26.02  35.29  39.84  41.61  18.55  63.54  17.46  18.99  14.42  45.77  38.91 
Japan 
1988  30.40  29.11  40.50  45.36  40.49  14.15  64.13  30.65  5.22  13.26  49.43  37.31 
1989  31.06  29.40  39.54  44.50  41.92  13.58  64.10  30.79  5.11  12.99  49.79  37.23 
1990  30.87  29.85  39.28  44.22  42.04  13.74  64.14  30.52  5.34  12.26  49.93  37.81 
1991  31.34  29.91  38.75  43.45  42.56  13.99  63.91  30.77  5.33  12.04  49.40  38.56 
Source: Calculated from the tapes of trade statistics of the United States and Japan. 
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States was 35.29 percent, much closer to the 38.75 percent share in Japan. 
Similar results also can be found in the classifications by capital intensity. Tai- 
wan and United States were closer in low capital-intensity products while Ja- 
pan and the United States were closer in high capital-intensity products. As 
implied, the comparative advantage of Taiwan was concentrated slightly more 
in products with medium degrees of labor or capital intensity. 
The differences among countries in the shares of commodities as classified 
by  human capital intensity are striking. In 1991 the shares of highly human- 
capital-intensive products in  exports were  63.54 and  63.91 percent  in  the 
United States and Japan, respectively, while the same measure was only 27.23 
percent in Taiwan. Thus, the export structure of Taiwan is still far behind Japan 
and the United States, while Japan and the United States are similar to each 
other in their trade structures. As for the shares of low human-capital-intensity 
products, the 1991 figures for Taiwan, the United States, and Japan are 34.26, 
18.99, and 5.33 percent, respectively. Japan seems to concentrate much more 
on products with a medium-degree of human capital intensity than does the 
United States. 
The shares of  products by  energy intensities did not differ much among 
these three countries. This result is interesting but the reasons for it are not yet 
clear. It is possible that energy and energy-related product prices do not play 
a major role in determining international comparative advantage for energy- 
intensive products. The argument of  Caves, Frankel, and Jones (1990) applies 
well in this case. 
The results presented in table 9.8 show that the United States enjoyed com- 
parative advantage in primary products, processed food, beverage and tobacco, 
energy and minerals, intermediate products, and consumer nondurable goods 
over Japan, while Japan performed better in  machinery and transportation 
equipment. In  comparison with its share of  Japanese and U.S. exports, con- 
sumer nondurable goods was the largest export category in Taiwan recently, 
although this share has been declining very rapidly. Even so, the share was still 
22 percent in 1991, compared with 7.72 and 3.92 percent in the United States 
and Japan, respectively. The share of  machinery in Taiwan’s exports was al- 
ready slightly higher than that of the United States in 1991. 
The export shares of heavy and chemical industries and high-tech products 
shown in tables 9.6 and 9.9 indicate again that the export structure of  the 
United States is between Taiwan’s and Japan’s, but much closer to Japan’s. The 
shares of heavy and chemical industries in 1991 were 85.76,65.71, and 46.71 
percent in Japan, the United States, and Taiwan, respectively. The shares of 
high-tech products in these three countries in  1991 were 70.14, 54.39, and 
36.23 percent, respectively. Thus, Taiwan still has a long way to go to achieve 
an export structure similar to that of  Japan or the United States. 
Before concluding this section, it is worthwhile to point out that the analysis 
presented here may be affected by the fact that the United States has a richer 
natural resource endowment so that its export shares of primary products and 240  Pochih Chen, Chi Schive, and Cheng Chung Chu 
Table 9.9  Share of Heavy and Chemical and High-Tech Products in U.S. and 
Japanese Exports,  1988-91  (%) 
Non-Heav y 
Heavy Chemical  Chemical 
Industries  Enterprises  High-Tech  Non-High-Tech 
Year  Products  Products  Products  Products 
~~ 
United States 
I989  63.17  36.83  52.39  47.61 
1990  64.77  35.23  53.52  46.48 
1991  65.71  34.29  54.39  45.61 
1988  86.27  13.73  70.72  29.58 
1989  86.42  13.58  70.64  29.36 
1990  85.87  14.13  70.54  29.46 
1991  85.76  14.24  70.14  29.86 
Jupun 
Source: See table 9.7. 
other natural-resource-intensive  products are higher. If comparisons are made 
on the basis of manufacturing goods only, with processed foods also excluded, 
then the export structure of the United States may be similar to that of Japan. 
However, Japan’s export structure would probably still be slightly ahead of that 
of the United States according to some measures such as human capital. The 
use of  Taiwan’s production characteristics in this study is another factor that 
should be considered a source of bias. 
9.6  Concluding Remarks 
Using different factor intensities and other measures to reclassify export 
data, this paper showed that the export structure of Taiwan has been changing 
rapidly toward that of  a developed country in the last few years. This paper 
also found that the export structure of the United States generally lies between 
the structures of  Taiwan and Japan, but much closer to Japan’s. However, the 
gaps between Taiwan and Japan and between Taiwan and the United States are 
still significant for many product categories. Therefore it is still too early to 
predict when Taiwan can achieve an export structure similar to that of Japan or 
the United States. 
An  interesting question is whether, since Japan is a major competitor of 
Taiwan’s in high-tech and human-capital-intensive  products in the international 
market, the greater strength of the Japanese yen relative to the NT dollar in the 
mid-1980s  was a factor in the structural change of Taiwan’s  export^.^ The an- 
swer is probably yes, but the degree of the yen‘s impact should not be exagger- 
ated. First, even though the rise of  the yen  pushed Taiwan’s real effective ex- 
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change rate down in 1986 (Schive 1992a) and thereby helped to boost exports 
by  30 percent that year, structural changes in Taiwan’s  exports did not take 
place until 1987. Thus, even if a very strong yen in 1985 and 1986 did facilitate 
Taiwan’s export of high-end products, it also helped promote Taiwan’s exports 
in general, so that the effect on overall trade structure, at least in the short run, 
was not significant. Moreover, the expansion of exports of Taiwan’s intermedi- 
ate and capital goods beginning in 1987 was, to a significant extent, directly 
attributable to Taiwan’s active outward investment that began that year and was 
therefore mostly unrelated to the yen’s value. It may be fair then to conclude 
that Taiwan’s export structure probably would not have changed as quickly as 
it did had the Japanese yen  not appreciated to its present level, but that the 
value of the yen was not a decisive factor in the change. 
Another interesting finding of this paper is that the speed of adjustment in 
Taiwan as well as the gaps among Taiwan, Japan, and the United States are 
significant when exports were classified by human capital intensity. This result 
implies that human capital may  play a key  role in determining international 
comparative advantage between  semideveloped and developed countries. If 
this proposition is true, human-capital-intensive industries should be targeted 
for Taiwan’s future development. An adequate supply of human capital will be 
vital to Taiwan’s success in the later stages of economic development. 
Highly human-capital-intensive industries have been developing quite well 
in Taiwan recently. Table 9.10 classifies Taiwan’s manufacturing sector by capi- 
tal intensity and human capital intensity. The production indices of these indus- 
try groups with high, middle, and low capital intensities have shown only mi- 
nor differences. Roughly speaking, between 1971 and 1986, industries with 
low capital intensity grew at about the same rate as those with high capital 
intensity, but the former lagged behind in the second half of  the 1980s. Al- 
though the growth rate in the second half  of  the  1980s was relatively high 
for industries with high capital intensity, industries with high human capital 
intensities grew at an even higher rate. Moreover, industries with low human 
capital content recorded a negative growth rate between 1986 and 1991. There- 
fore, changes in the production structure in Taiwan were similar to those in the 
export structure, and human capital seems to be the dominant factor in Taiwan’s 
international competitiveness. 
In view of  both the theoretical arguments and empirical findings, human- 
capital-intensive products are also likely to be the products with which ad- 
vanced countries may have comparative advantage. Although advanced coun- 
tries are usually more affluent in capital, human capital, and technology, the 
degree of international mobility of human capital seems to be lower than that 
of capital and technology. Consequently, capital-intensive  products may be eas- 
ier to transplant and produce in less-developed countries than human-capital- 
intensive products. Therefore, human capital would be the dominant factor in 
determining a country’s comparative advantage. Further study along this line 
is clearly warranted. 242  Pochih Chen, Chi Schive, and Cheng Chung Chu 
Table 9.10  Industrial Production Indices by Capital and Human Capital 
Intensities: Taiwan, 1971-91 (1986 = 100) 
Capital Intensity  Human Capital Intensity 
































































16.95  17.57 
18.81  21.19 
23.12  25.25 
19.74  22.92 
24.06  22.87 
35.17  32.20 
39.99  38.24 
49.55  47.14 
50.85  51.08 
54.28  52.78 
59.16  66.14 
59.60  63.74 
71.25  76.47 
83.92  84.15 
82.49  86.51 
100.00  100.00 
112.29  113.92 
113.90  122.95 
116.34  120.94 
107.87  135.33 











































Source: Strategies  for the Development of Manufacturing Sector (Taipei: Taiwan Institute for Eco- 
nomic Research, 1992). 
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Comment  Rachel McCulloch 
From  1980 until  1985, the Central Bank of  Taiwan maintained a fixed ex- 
change rate between the NT dollar and the U.S. dollar despite a soaring trade 
surplus and a politically troublesome bilateral trade imbalance with the United 
States. In  1985, Taiwan  yielded to US. pressure to allow the NT dollar to 
appreciate as a means of  reducing the large bilateral imbalance. This paper 
analyzes changes in Taiwan’s export structure during the subsequent period. 
Post-1985 changes in Taiwan’s exports reflect the rise in the value of the NT 
dollar relative to the currencies of most of its trading partners (although not 
Japan), as well as the rapid increase in NT dollar wage rates that began early 
in the 1980s when Taiwan moved into an era of tight labor markets. Over the 
period 1980-88,  the rise in the value of the NT dollar and in NT dollar wage 
rates together produced a larger rise in unit labor costs (measured in U.S.  dol- 
lars) than was experienced by any of Taiwan’s trade competitors, including even 
Japan. However, a third potent agent of change is not mentioned by the authors: 
U.S. trade policy, which in  1985 shifted abruptly from a largely laissez-faire 
approach to an active stance emphasizing reduction of  bilateral trade imbal- 
ances. 
Using an input-output table for 1986, Chen, Schive, and Chu classify Tai- 
wan’s  exports into broad groups according to their production characteristics: 
labor intensity, capital intensity, and human capital intensity. As one might 
expect given the rapidly rising unit labor costs, the share of high labor-intensity 
products in Taiwan’s exports fell from 47 percent in 1986 to 40 percent in 1991, 
while the share of exports with low labor intensities rose from 15 percent to 
21 percent over the same period. The authors term the speed of  adjustment 
“only moderate,” implicitly raising the interesting question of how to judge the 
speed of  adjustment to changing circumstances. In fact, Taiwan’s exports of 
some high labor-intensity products, apparel in particular, had been constrained 
by trade policies abroad to levels below those justified by comparative advan- 
tage alone. Thus, one hidden effect of the rapidly rising unit labor costs was to 
reduce the inconsistency between the constrained export levels and domestic 
costs of production. 
Rachel McCulloch is Rosen Family Professor of Economics at Brandeis University and a re- 
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Other likely changes in the manufacturing sector to reduce the impact of 
increased labor costs cannot be assessed from the methodology used by  the 
authors. Because they rely on a single year’s input-output structure, the adjust- 
ment measured includes only the part achieved through changes in export mix, 
not the part achieved through changes in the way any given product was manu- 
factured. Therefore, to the extent firms economized on labor through increased 
mechanization of  production, the authors’ approach understates the true re- 
sponse. Problems of interpretation also arise in the case of direct investment in 
neighboring (presumably lower-wage) countries, because intermediate prod- 
ucts previously used in domestic production of exports may now become ex- 
ports to subsidiaries abroad. Such export increases do not represent new de- 
mand for domestic output. Finally, even in the absence of changing unit labor 
costs, quantitative trade restrictions such as voluntary export restraints are 
likely to induce upgrading of the restricted exports over time, which often also 
means changes in the production characteristics of these exports. 
The authors go on to compare Taiwan’s export structure with those of  Japan 
and the United States. They find Taiwan’s export structure has become more 
like that of these two highly developed countries, with the United States lying 
between Taiwan and Japan, but closer to Japan, on most dimensions of export 
structure. The authors conclude their comparison with the observation that 
“Taiwan still has a long way to go to achieve an export structure similar to that 
of Japan or the United States.” This statement seems to imply that all wealthy 
countries can be expected to have  similar export structures. Should Taiwan’s 
success, or lack of success, in economic development be judged on the basis 
of  its export structure? In fact, rich countries with similar levels of GDP per 
capita differ widely in the structure of their merchandise exports. As the au- 
thors note, the United States is more abundant than Japan in land and natural 
resources, an element of comparative advantage reflected in the two countries’ 
very different extent of primary-commodity exports. A more interesting com- 
parison is of Japan and Germany. Like Japan, Germany has small primary ex- 
ports and very large manufactured exports, but the composition of Germany’s 
manufactured exports is quite different from that of Japan. While machinery 
and transport equipment accounted for two-thirds of Japan’s 1990 exports, this 
category made up less than one-half of German exports. 
The aggregate data presented by  Chen, Schive, and Chu hint at a fascinating 
story to be told at the industry level. The authors’ discussion focuses entirely 
on broad commodity groups, yielding such information as that “heavy and 
chemical industries” generated 86 percent of exports from Japan in 1991 but 
only 47 percent of  Taiwan’s exports, and that “type B intermediate products, 
which are those intermediate products readily usable as final products” have 
replaced “consumer nondurable goods” as Taiwan’s  biggest export category. 
Apparel and semiconductors are never mentioned. Augmenting the analysis of 
broad trends with some detail on the commodity composition of Taiwan’s ex- 
ports, or even case studies of adjustment by individual firms, could provide a 
more complete picture of the nation’s recent economic transformation. 245  Export Structure and Exchange Rate Variation in Taiwan 
COmIIleIlt  Shin-ichi Fukuda 
This paper gives very interesting information about the Taiwanese economy in 
the 1980s. Focusing on export structure, the authors describe the drastic struc- 
tural change that took place in the Taiwanese economy around 1985. Such 
analysis is very  important because Taiwan  achieved  remarkable economic 
growth in the 1980s. Although the paper is clearly written, I have four com- 
ments. 
My first comment is on the comparison of the export structures of Taiwan, 
Japan, and the United States. The authors show that the export structure of the 
United States lies between those of  Taiwan and Japan. However, this result 
seems strange to me because I can find no reason for the export structure of 
the United States to be less developed than that of  Japan. Furthermore, the 
export to GNP ratio in Taiwan is more than 50 percent, while the export to GNP 
ratios in Japan and the United States are less than 20 percent. This implies that 
the role of exports in Taiwan is not simply comparable to that in Japan or the 
United States. 
My second comment is on the data sample. The paper focuses on the sample 
period of the 1980s, especially the late 1980s. I agree that this was the most 
noteworthy period for Taiwanese economic growth. However, in general, ten 
years or five years is too short a span over which to discuss economic develop- 
ment. For such a short period, it is difficult to distinguish economic growth 
from business cycles. For example, the authors stress the very rapid structural 
change after 1985. However it is possible that this change reflects the tempo- 
rary boom of business cycles in the Taiwanese economy. 
My  third comment is on the factors that caused structural change in the 
Taiwanese economy after 1985. As the authors stress, the main force behind 
the structural change was the drastic appreciation of the NT dollar after 1985. 
This appreciation made labor in Taiwan more expensive and led to a less labor- 
intensive and more capital-intensive industry structure. However, in my view, 
another important factor was the drastic appreciation of the Japanese yen. AS 
we can see in table 9.1, the appreciation of the Japanese yen  was even more 
drastic than that of the NT dollar. Since Japan is one of Taiwan’s main competi- 
tors in the less labor-intensive and more capital-intensive industries, it is quite 
possible that appreciation of  the Japanese yen  accelerated structural change 
in Taiwan. 
My final comment is on the trade balance in the Taiwanese economy. I am 
quite interested in how this was affected by  the structural change in the late 
1980s. If we look at data on the Taiwanese trade balance, we find a surplus 
throughout the 1980s. However the total trade balance of Taiwan was decreas- 
ing in the late 1980s because of the rapid increase in imports after 1985. Ac- 
cording to a standard theory of the stages of economic development, the trade 
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balance is deficit in the first stage, becomes surplus in the second stage, and 
goes back to deficit in the third stage. It is usually said that Japan with its large 
trade surplus is in the second stage and the United States with its large trade 
deficit is in the third stage. Is it then appropriate to say that the recently de- 
creasing trade surplus in Taiwan can be interpreted as foretelling the end of 
Taiwan’s second stage of economic development? 